June 5, 2026

Iran Plans to Seize Control of Undersea Internet Cables in the Strait of Hormuz,Demanding Permits and Tolls

Reflecto News | Technology & Security | Geopolitics

TEHRAN — Iran has announced plans to take full control of the seven undersea internet cables passing through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, demanding that foreign operators obtain permits, pay tolls, and operate under Iranian law . The proposal would also grant Iranian companies exclusive control over the maintenance and repair of the cables, transforming the waterway into what Tehran calls one of its “digital power levers” .

The move dramatically expands Iran’s asserted authority over the strait, which it already claims to control for oil tankers and commercial shipping. The new “governance model” for submarine cables, announced by Iranian media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), comes as the two-month war with the United States and Israel enters a fragile but increasingly tense ceasefire period .

🌐 A Digital Chokepoint: The ‘Hidden Highways’ of the Global Internet

The Strait of Hormuz is not only a critical artery for global oil supplies—carrying approximately 20 percent of the world’s petroleum—but it is also an equally vital, and largely invisible, passageway for the digital world . Several fiber-optic cables snake across the seabed of the narrow waterway, connecting Asia and Africa to Europe via the Gulf states and Egypt .

Key Undersea Cables Passing Through the Strait of Hormuz

Cable systemRoute
Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1)Southeast Asia to Europe via Egypt (landing points include UAE, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia)
FALCONIndia and Sri Lanka to Gulf countries, Sudan, and Egypt
Gulf Bridge International (GBI)Links all Gulf countries, including Iran
TGN-GulfRegional system serving Gulf states
SEA-ME-WESoutheast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe (extensive network)

These fiber-optic cables carry an estimated 97–99 percent of the world’s internet traffic, including approximately $10 trillion in daily financial transactions .

📜 Iran’s Proposed ‘Three Practical Steps’

Iranian media outlets, including the IRGC-linked Tasnim and Fars news agencies, have laid out a three-part plan to bring the undersea cables under Tehran’s control .

1. Permits, Licensing, and Tolls

Under the proposed governance model, the passage of submarine cables would “be conducted with a permit and payment of tolls, and foreign companies must also operate under Iranian laws” . This would include initial licensing fees and annual renewal charges for foreign operators .

2. Exclusive Control for Iranian Companies

Iran wants all management, repair, and maintenance of the cables to be “exclusively entrusted to Iranian companies, so that the Strait of Hormuz becomes one of Iran’s digital power levers” .

3. Legal Subordination to Iranian Authority

Foreign technology giants, such as Google, Amazon, and Microsoft, which own or lease capacity on these cables, would be required to operate under Iranian jurisdiction and legal frameworks . Iran argues that the right of “transit passage” under international law does not remove its sovereign authority to regulate the cables, claiming they lie legally within an area where it can exercise such control .

⚔️ The IRGC’s ‘Veiled Threat’ and Pattern of Escalation

The announcement is not occurring in a vacuum. Throughout April 2026, Tasnim published detailed maps of the undersea cables and regional data hubs, explicitly noting that “simultaneous damage to several major cables—whether through accidents or deliberate action—could trigger severe outages across the Persian Gulf” .

The report was published with a graphic showing a detailed cable map, a tactic analysts have noted mirrors the Houthi playbook that preceded attacks on cables in the Red Sea in 2024 . In those incidents, Houthi-aligned forces publicly signaled their intent, then severed four cables connecting Saudi Arabia and Djibouti less than three weeks later . This has led to widespread concern that Tehran is using state-linked media to “signal” a capability and intent to carry out sabotage if its demands are not met .

The IRGC has a massive fleet of fast-attack boats that are ideal for deploying divers or dragging anchors across the seabed in a way that offers Tehran “plausible deniability” . “By the time those questions are answered… the damage is already done, and entire regions can remain offline for weeks or months,” Asia Times reports .

⚡ Global Implications: A ‘Digital War of Attrition’

If implemented, Iran’s control over the undersea cables would have catastrophic consequences for the digital economy . This is not merely about internet speeds; it undermines the very backbone of global finance, cloud computing, and AI infrastructure upon which the modern world relies .

  • Financial Impact: Disruption for even a few days could cause “tens to hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to the regional and global economy,” according to Iranian media .
  • Data Sovereignty: Foreign companies would be forced to surrender operational control and submit to Iranian surveillance and legal oversight, a non-starter for most Western firms .
  • Repair Logjam: Cable repair ships require permits to enter territorial waters—a process that could be weaponized by Tehran to indefinitely delay repairs in a hostile environment .

Iran is currently in a “no deal, no war” stalemate with the US. By threatening to sever the digital arteries of the Gulf states and the world, Tehran is dramatically raising the stakes as Western powers debate whether to re-engage in nuclear diplomacy or escalate military force in the Strait .

Key Takeaways

AspectSummary
The DemandIran demands permits, tolls, and legal jurisdiction over 7 undersea internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz .
The MechanismIRGC-linked media is signaling readiness to cut or disrupt the cables (through “accidents” or proxy action) if demands are ignored .
The StakesThese cables carry 99% of internet traffic and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions, making this a potential digital economic weapon .
The PrecedentIran-aligned forces followed a similar “signal-and-strike” pattern with undersea cables in the Red Sea in 2024 .
The ResponseGulf states have discussed land-based alternatives, but experts say there is no immediate replacement for subsea cable capacity .

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